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Introduction
After the renewal of banks regulatory framework with the Basel II agreement in 2003, the
European Commission has developped new capital standards for insurance companies
which are referred to as ”Solvency 2”, to be implemented in early 2016. This new
solvency regulation of insurers differs markedly from earlier standards by aiming to
determine capital requirements on the basis of the net risk position of their balance
sheet, as is now the case for banks. However, banking and insurance activities are
different by nature, in terms of liquidity, maturity transformation and guarantees. A
crucial question for life insurers and collective defined-contribution pension funds is to
determine whether the new prudential regulation in Europe should recognize the long
maturity of life insurance liabilities and the insurers’ role as intermediaries promoting
intergenerational risk sharing (see Gollier [2008]), two aspects of insurance activities
that are irrelevant in the banking sector. If policyholders have themselves a long-term
perspective for their saving, it is important that these financial intermediaries get the
right incentives to select assets portfolios that fit best their customers’ interests, both in
risk and in maturity. The current Solvency 2 regulation is based on the hypothesis that
the equity risk is stable through time and is independent of the duration of the holding
period. This hypothesis justifies using solvency rules in insurance that are similar to
those used in the banking sector in spite of the important differences in the duration
and liquidity of their liabilities. In this paper, we reevaluate this hypothesis. More
specifically, we quantify the relationship between the equity risk and both the holding
duration and the state the financial market is in.
Actually, the risk-based capital requirements now prevailing in the banking sector
have themselves been widely criticized because they could exacerbate financial cycles,
or more generally business cycle fluctuations (see e.g. Kashyap and Stein [2004], Adrian
and Shin [2008, 2010], Plantin, Sapra and Shin [2008], Rochet [2008]). Basically, these
authors claim that solvency capital requirements (SCR hereafter) rules which do not de-
pend on the state of the business/financial cycle may lead to large pro-cyclical leverage
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effects. As a result of such rules, investors demand of securities increases during finan-
cial booms, thereby reinforcing them. Conversely, investors have to sell securities during
financial downturns in order to restore their solvency ratios, which exacerbates the fi-
nancial recession.1 Yet, a cyclical SCR rule allowing for smaller capital requirements
during downturns could at least dampen, if not completely eliminate, this procyclical
leverage effect.
Providing further support to such a cyclical SCR rule, a growing empirical literature
points to predictability and mean-reversion in stocks returns (see e.g. Campbell [1991],
Campbell [1996], Barberis [2000], Campbell and Viceira [2002], Bec and Gollier [2007],
Campbell and Thompson [2008] or Jondeau and Rockinger [2009]). More precisely, ex-
cess stock returns risk is found to be mean reverting in the sense that the risk associated
with long holding periods is lesser than the one associated with short holding horizons
as e.g. the widely scrutinized one-year horizon. Beyond this potential investment hori-
zon effect, returns mean reversion may also imply a cyclical effect. In other words, the
financial cycle’s position could help predicting future returns and future risk.
Our contribution to this literature is twofold. First, we assess empirically the im-
portance of these cyclical and investment horizon effects for French stock price data.
For comparison purpose, the widely studied US data are also considered. The question
is explored by modelling the dynamics of excess return of equities from a self-exciting
threshold autoregression (hereafter SETAR) model. This setup aims at disentangling
bear and bull markets dynamics. The choice of this representation is basically motivated
by the fact that it allows for straightforward computation of the conditional first and
second-order moments matrices, namely the conditional mean and variance-covariance
matrices. Hence, two crucial variables for dynamic portfolio allocation optimization are
obtained easily — the time-t conditional expectation (forecast) and conditional variance
(risk measure) for asset returns at horizon t + h. Our second contribution is then to
propose a measure of the Value-at-Risk based on the SETAR estimates which takes the
1See Adrian and Shin [2010] for a very clear presentation of this procyclical leverage effect.
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influence of the recent cycle conditions into account. It is in line with existing measures
in that it derives from the empirical distribution of the expected k−period returns.
Nevertheless, it has the advantage of not imposing any assumption regarding the law
of distribution of the sample but relies on bootstrapped quantiles instead.2. Finally, we
take advantage of this analysis to propose a cycle-dependent measure of the Solvency
Capital Requirement which accounts for the illiquidity risk.
Using quarterly French and US data from 1970Q4 on, it turns out that both cyclical
and horizon effects do influence the Value-at-Risk: the expected future returns are higher
(and the Value-at-Risk more favorable) from a crisis than from a normal or bull market,
and lower for long than for short investment horizons. These findings suggest that
if the prudential regulation aims at maintaining a constant yearly default risk, SCR
rules should be flexible enough so as to take these cyclical and horizon effects into
account. More precisely, for the countries considered here, the SCR rules should induce
intermediaries to be more conservative in long phases of normal or high returns and to be
more risk-taking in downturns. Failing to recognize these features of financial markets
would induce financial intermediaries with long and illiquid liabilities to overreact to
downturns on the equity markets, and to excessively reduce their equity holdings over
the entire financial cycle.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 presents the econometric methodology.
Section 2 describes the data used for the threshold autoregression presented in Section
3. In Section 4, estimated stocks returns VaR are compared across investment horizons
and phases of financial cycle. Section 5 concludes.
1 SETAR modelling of VaR
1.1 The SETAR model
Let R0t denote the nominal short rate and r0t = log(1 + R0t) the log (or continuously
compounded) return on this asset that is used as a benchmark to compute excess re-
2See e.g. Feunou and Meddahi [2007] for a different approach to derive the term structure of risk.
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turns on equities. Then, with ret the log stock return, let xet = ret − r0t denote the
corresponding log excess returns that we wish to model as a Self-Exciting Threshold
AutoRegression. In what follows, two kinds of SETAR will be considered for xet. The
first one is a two-regime SETAR model which aims at capturing high vs low regimes
and is given by:
xet = (µℓ +
n∑
i=1
ρℓixe,t−i)st + (µu +
n∑
i=1
ρuixe,t−i)(1− st) + vt, (1)
where st is a zero-one valued transition function defined by:
st =
{
1 if xe,t−1 ≤ λ,
0 otherwise.
Hence, we expect the dynamics of the excess returns to be regime-switching with xe,t−1
as the transition variable. More precisely, for values of xe,t−1 smaller than or equal to
the threshold λ, the dynamics is governed by µℓ and ρℓi: this corresponds to the bear
market regime. In the bull market regime, where values of xe,t−1 are greater than λ, the
dynamics is governed by µu and ρui.
3 It is assumed that the roots of the characteristic
polynomials ρj(z) = 1 − ρj1z − . . . − ρjnz
n, j = ℓ, u, lie strictly outside the unit circle
in absolute value, a condition which rules out nonstationary or explosive behavior in
xe,t. Finally, the innovations vt are assumed to be i.i.d. distributed with mean zero and
variance σ2v . The second SETAR specification of interest is a 3-regime SETAR of the
form:
xet = (µℓ +
n∑
i=1
ρℓixe,t−i)sℓt + (µm +
n∑
i=1
ρmixe,t−i)smt + (µu +
n∑
i=1
ρuixe,t−i)sut + vt, (2)
where sℓt = 1 if xe,t−1 ≤ λℓ and 0 otherwise, sut = 1 if xe,t−1 > λu and 0 otherwise,
with λu > λℓ and smt = 1 − sℓt − sut. There are now two real-valued thresholds, λℓ
and λu. In this 3-regime SETAR, we allow for a middle regime on top of the lower
3Of course, this model is retained as a first approach of threshold modeling of the excess returns and
cannot capture the fact that high expected returns do not have the same interpretation in periods of
high or low volatility. Nevertheless, we believe that at a quarterly frequency, this simplification is not
too misleading.
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and upper regimes. This middle regime could correspond i.e. to a “normal” regime, in
between the bear and bull markets. Contrary to the 2-regime model, the specification
given in Equation (2) could also capture a distinction between large absolute values of
the returns (in the lower and upper regimes) and smaller ones (in the middle regime).
1.2 From SETAR to Value-at-Risk
Following Campbell and Viceira [2004], the one-period log excess returns are added
over k successive periods in order to get the cumulative k−period log excess returns
on equities, denoted xket ≡ (xe,t+1 + · · · + xe,t+k). Thanks to its autoregressive nature,
the SETAR model is particularly well suited for forecasting purposes. Indeed, the k
successive one-period returns used to define xket are obtained by forward recursion of
models (1) or (2).
Hence, the value-at-risk obtains straightforwardly from this model. The VaR is
basically defined as a number such that there is a probability p that a worse excess (log-
)return occurs over the next k periods. Throughout this paper, the VaR is defined from
the left tail of the loss and profit distribution function. Hence, a negative (respectively
positive) VaR denotes a loss (resp. profit), contrary to the alternative definition based on
the profit and loss distribution. Hence, the VaR over the time horizon k with probability
p may be defined from:
p = Pr
[
xket ≤ V aRk(p)
]
= Fk(V aRk(p)), (3)
where Fk(·) denotes the cumulative distribution function of xket. The quantile function
is the inverse of the cumulative distribution function from which the VaR obtains:
V aRk(p) = F
−1
k (p). (4)
Since xket is the sum of log excess returns over k periods, it is also the log of the product of
the excess returns (not taken in log) over k periods. Hence, the VaR of the corresponding
portfolio value simply obtains as:
V aRcrk (p) = exp(V aRk(p))− 1
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Since we are interested in the Value-at-Risk for various time horizons, it is desirable
to keep an equivalent risk level over all the horizons, which means adjusting p with
k. For instance, the 1 − p = 95% level retained in VaR analysis is chosen on a yearly
basis. In order to maintain the same yearly probability, the corresponding probability
for horizon k should be adjusted accordingly. Unfortunately, the question of the correct
adjustment regarding returns on equities is still open so far. Consequently, just to give
an idea of how the time-horizon may affect this probability, we propose a very crude
approximation instead, that is 1 − p = (95%)k.4 All the VaR computations below will
be made by fixing p to 5%, 10%, etc... for all horizons on the one hand and by using
this horizon-adjusted probability on the other hand.
2 The data
The benchmark asset from which the excess returns on equities will be calculated is a
short rate. For France, the 3-month PIBOR rate obtained from Datastream is retained
from 1970M11 to 1998M12. It is then continued using the 3-month EURIBOR rate from
1999M1 to 2012M12. For the US, we use the three-month Treasury Bills rate. The end-
of-quarter values from these monthly series are retained to get quarterly observations,
and r0t denotes the log return on the 3-month rate.
French and US data for stock prices and returns come from Morgan Stanley Capital
International (MSCI) database and are available since December 1969. More precisely,
using the monthly MSCI National Price and Gross Return Indices in local currency, a
quarterly stock total return series and a quarterly dividend series are obtained following
the methodology described in Campbell [1999]5. Note that we depart from Campbell’s
approach by not including the tax credits on dividends. Indeed, MSCI calculates returns
4This horizon correction is usually retained in default models with time independency. Note that
even with i.i.d. returns, it wouldn’t be correct. This crude approximation consists basically in assuming
that the survival function of the mean of x1 and x2 is the square of the survival function of x1.
5See also Campbell’s “Data Appendix for Asset Prices, Consumption and the Business Cycle”,
March 1998, downloadable from Campbell’s homepage.
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from the perspective of US investors, so it excludes from its indices these tax credits
which are available only to local investors. For France, Campbell chooses to add back
the tax credits quite roughly, by applying the 1992 rate of 33.33% to all the sample.
Nevertheless, this rate hasn’t remained fixed over the sample considered here (1970Q1—
2012Q4). On top of this, the way dividends are taxed has also changed during that
period. We couldn’t find exact tax rate data for our sample and have chosen to work
with data excluding tax credits. The equities excess return, xet, is then obtained by
substracting r0t from the log return on equities.
Figure 4 in Appendix reports annualized French and US log excess return on equities
data.
3 Empirical assessment of the influence of the finan-
cial market cycle on equities log excess returns
The lag order n of the SETAR models is chosen so as to eliminate residuals serial
correlation, which leads to retain one lag. For both models (1) and (2), we have also
considered a constrained version in which the intercept is assumed to be the same across
regimes, i.e. µℓ = µu(= µm). The threshold estimates were obtained by grid search so as
to i) leave at least 5% of the observations in each regime and ii) minimize the model’s
sum of squared residuals. First, we performed linearity tests. Since the thresholds are
unidentified nuisance parameters under the null hypothesis, we use the SupLR statistic
whose non standard asymptotic distribution obtains from Hansen [1996]. The residual
bootstrap method described in Hansen and Seo [2002] is used to compute the p-value.
The results of these linearity tests, based on 5000 simulations, are reported in Table 1
below.
In France, the two- and three-regime models with a constrained intercept reject
the null of linearity at the 5%-level. Since the comparison of these models involves
a (second) threshold which is an unidentified nuisance parameter under the two-regime
null hypothesis, a standard LR test cannot be performed to this end. To circumvent this
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Table 1: SupLR linearity tests p-values
Model (1) Model (1) Model (2) Model (2)
unconstrained constrained unconstrained constrained
France 0.21 0.05 0.18 0.05
US 0.08 0.03 0.01 0.03
issue, a SupLR statistics can be used again: it leads to a bootstrap p-value of 11% and
hence does not reject the null of a constrained two-regime model at conventional levels.
The latter will accordingly be used in the subsequent empirical analysis. By contrast,
only the unconstrained intercept two-regime model does not reject the linear null in the
US: three SETAR candidates remain possible. Since the constrained and unconstrained
versions of the three-regime model are nested with the linear restrictions µℓ = µu = µm,
these constraints can be tested using a standard LR test. The corresponding LR statistics
is equal to 16.20 and is χ2(2) distributed: the constrained three-regime model is strongly
rejected. Then, according to the SupLR test performed to compare the unconstrained
three-regime model and the two-regime model with a constrained intercept, the null
of a constrained two-regime model can be rejected with a bootstrap p-value of 1%.
Consequently, the unconstrained three-regime model is retained for the US data.
The OLS estimates of the selected SETAR models are reported in Table 2, see Ap-
pendix. For these SETAR(1) models, the null of no residuals serial correlation up to
order 4 is not rejected according to the Portmanteau and LM test statistics. It is also
worth noticing that, likely due to the quarterly frequency of our observations sample,
both ARCH andWhite F tests do not reject the homoskedastic null hypothesis. Actually,
returns data heteroskedasticity is mainly a high frequency phenomenon.
In the two-regime model retained for French data, the threshold estimate is -22.56%,
which is strongly negative. As can be seen from Figure 4 in Appendix, which plots the
log excess returns together with the threshold value, the lower regime basically accounts
for the financial crisis which happened during the period: the two oil price shocks with
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the financial market troughs in 1974 and 1977, the election of the left-hand President
Franc¸ois Mitterrand in the second quarter of 1981, the stocks markets Black Monday in
the fourth quarter of 1987, the Asian financial crisis at the end of 1990 and 1998, the
internet bubble burst in 2001 and 2002, and finally the subprimes crisis which makes the
French returns on equities visit the lower regime in 2008. Since only nine observations
out of 168 are classified in this low regime6, it seems to capture the troughs, or crisis,
rather than bear market times: The average of the log excess returns in this regime is -
29.50%. The autoregressive coefficient estimate ρℓ is -0.26 — the nullity of this coefficient
is rejected at the 6%-level — which implies strong mean reversion in this regime. In
the upper regime, where most of the observations lie, ρu is 0.21 which suggests a slight
persistence. The average of the observations lying in the upper regime is 3.39%.
The same troughs are captured by the lower regime in the unconstrained three-regime
model retained for the US data. However, this model fails to capture a “normal” regime:
While λℓ is estimated at -9.95%, the second threshold is also found strongly negative
with an estimate of -6.81%. Looking at Figure 4, where λℓ and λu are plotted, it appears
that the middle regime basically captures the returns fall which forgoes a large trough.
As can be seen from Table 2, ρm = 13.21, which means that a negative observation in
this regime will have a negative impact on the next observation, whereas there is still
strong mean reversion in the lower regime through the corresponding positive intercept
µℓ.
Overall, these two SETAR models yield quite similar results: There is strong mean-
reversion in the lower regime and there is some persistence in the upper regime, even
though rather weak. If the dynamics of the log returns is regime-dependent, so should
be the dynamics of the Value-at-Risk as will be checked below.
6Note however that the estimated threshold is not the lower boundary of the grid-search interval.
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4 The dynamics of Value-at-Risk
4.1 The VaRk based on filtered historical simulations
The bootstrap method described below belongs to the filtered historical simulation
(FHS) method presented in Chirstoffersen [2009]. This method consists in simulat-
ing future returns from a model using historical return innovations. It is qualified by
“filtered” because it does not use simulations from the set of returns directly, but from
the set of shocks, which are basically returns such as filtered here by the SETAR model.
The FHS method described in Chirstoffersen [2009] would amount in our case to
the following: First, using random draws from a uniform distribution, the estimated
residuals of model (1) or (2) are resampled S times. Using these S series of vs together
with the estimated parameters of the corresponding model and the observed value of
xe,t−1, S hypothetical sequences of x
k
et are obtained by forward recursion of the SETAR
model. Finally, a conditional V aRk(p) is calculated by retaining — amongst these S
simulated sequences — the value of return such that there is a probability p that a
worse value occurs at horizon k. This method clearly accounts for the uncertainty of
the shocks realization. However, by setting xse,t−1 = xe,t−1, it makes the VaR measure
strongly dependent on the last available observations: contrary to the definition given
earlier in Equation (4), this method defines the Value-at-Risk conditionally to past
returns values. In order to illustrate this, Figures 1 and 2 report this time-dependent
VaR measure calculated from 200,000 simulations for the one- to three-year investment
horizons and for all t from 1980Q1 on. For each date t, the corresponding SETAR is
estimated from 1971Q1 until t, which yields the k−year VaRs by the bootstrap method
described above. These figures also plot the ex-post observed values of exp(xket) − 1.
Even though time-dependent, these conditional VaRs are still much less volatile than
the corresponding expected returns: the latter’s volatility is around four times larger
than the conditional VaR at the one-year horizon and a little bit more than ten times
larger at the 3-year horizon. Then, for all these investment horizons, the VaRs under-
estimates the stock return risk during the 2001-2002 and 2007-2008 episodes. Table 3
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Figure 1: French VaR and corresponding observed returns
in appendix reports out-of-sample tests of predictive accuracy of the models considered
here for the V aR(5%)’s up to five years. Following the lines of e.g. Guidolin and
Timmermann [2006], we consider the unconditional coverage probability which is the
percentage of VaRs above the corresponding ex-post observed return, as well as the
SP test statistic given in Escanciano and Olmo [2009], Equation (5) therein. This SP
statistic refers to the so-called unconditional backtesting which tests wether or not the
unconditional expectation of the ‘hits’ or ‘exceedances’ is equal to the theoretical one.7
From the unconditional coverage probabilities, it turns out that the SETAR model is
7Under the null, (p(1 − p))−0.5SP has a standard normal distribution given the DGP is known. In
practice, the DGP parameters are estimated but Escanciano and Olmo [2009] show that this uncondi-
tional S-test still possesses rather good finite-sample power properties even in presence of estimation
risk. See also Giacomini andWhite [2006] for a comparison of unconditional and conditional backtesting.
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Figure 2: US VaR and corresponding observed returns
slightly too liberal at the one-year horizon. As expected, it tends to become much too
conservative at longer horizons, particularly when the probability p is held constant over
horizons. In France, the unconditional backtesting does not reject the null of forecasting
accuracy for most horizons. In the US, the null is rejected after the three-year horizon
only.
4.2 Empirical measures of VaRk across investment horizon and
financial market state
Finally, since we aim at evaluating the impact of the state the financial market is in on
the VaR for various investment horizons, we would rather control for its position. This
is done by initializing the value of the excess return for the forward recursion of model
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(1) or (2) with the average of observations lying respectively in the lower, middle (if any)
and upper regimes. In this variant, we also adapt the bootstrap procedure to account
for possibly neglected residuals heteroskedasticity following the lines described in e.g.
Cavaliere, Rahbek and Taylor [2010]: instead of being resampled, the estimated SETAR
residuals are multiplied by a Gaussian i.i.d. N (0, 1) sequence so that the resulting
simulated residuals keep the same heteroskedastic features as the estimated ones.
The results reported below were obtained for S = 200, 000 simulations for each
k = 1, · · · , 15 years, from which the p ∈ {0.05, 0.1, 0.15, 0.2, 0.25, 0.3, 0.35, 0.4, 0.45, 0.5}
quantiles are picked up for each V aRcrk . Figure 3 plots the regime-dependent measures
of V aRcrk described above against holding horizons up to fifteen years
8.
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Figure 3: French Value-at-Risk(95k%) across cycle and horizons
The first important result emerging from this figure is that whatever the investment
horizon, the VaR depends on the state the financial market is in. For all horizons, the
VaR is worst in upper regime than in the lower one. The VaR’s gap between these two
8The corresponding figures are available upon request.
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regimes at the one-year horizon is around 5% for both countries. This gap widens up
to about 15% at the 15-year horizon, but such long-horizons results must be cautiously
interpreted since the model is estimated using thirty-seven years only. Note that for all
investment horizons in the US, the largest VaR in absolute value appears in the middle
regime. This confirms our interpretation of this regime as the one capturing the returns
fall which forgoes a large trough. The VaR’s gap between the lower and middle regimes
reaches 7% at the one-year horizon. Overall, these results suggest that a rule imposing
the same solvency capital requirement whatever the state of the financial market could
actually be pro-cyclical.
The second important result regards the dynamics of the VaR across investment
horizons. In a previous study (see Bec and Gollier [2007]), mean-reversion was found in
log returns on French equities relatively to other assets returns: their relative risk was
found decreasing with the holding period. The same result was found by Campbell and
Viceira [2002] for US quarterly data. This is confirmed by our results as can be seen in
Figure 3.
As a further check, the simulations were also performed fitting distribution laws that
allow for larger tails, since extreme risks can hardly be captured from such a short period
as the one considered here. This is a shortcoming of the bootstrap approach retained
above.
As can be seen in Figures 5 and 6 reported in appendix, only an extreme value
distribution9 is able to capture the fat left tail of the residuals distribution. Figures 7
and 8 in appendix show the resulting regime and horizon dependent Value-at-Risk when
using 100,000 random draws from the fitted extreme value distribution (the Student-t
distribution is also used for comparison purpose): As expected, the VaRs corresponding
to small p worsen when residuals are drawn from the extreme value distribution, but
both financial market state and horizon effects are confirmed.
9The probability density function for the extreme value distribution with location parameter µ and
scale parameter σ is f(x|µ, σ) = σ−1 exp
(
x−µ
σ
)
exp
(
− exp
(
x−µ
σ
))
.
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5 Concluding remarks
The SETAR modelling of French and US stocks excess returns provides evidence of
the regime-dependent nature of their dynamics: large downturns are strongly corrected
whereas a slight persistence is found otherwise. Since the Value-at-Risk is evaluated from
the expected excess returns, it is also influenced by the state the financial market is in.
The VaR calculated from a trough corresponds to smaller losses than the ones evaluated
in the bull market for all investment horizons. Our results provide support to the claim
that fixed solvency capital requirements may have important procyclical consequences
for the dynamic investment strategies of the financial intermediaries. They also suggest
some predictability in equities returns since they point to a decrease in the absolute
value of the VaR as the holding period increases. One limit of the approach retained
here is that it assumes the existence of financial markets cycles without explaining their
origins. A better understanding of this phenomenon is a challenging question on our
research agenda.
References
Adrian, T. and H.S. Shin, Liquidity and financial contagion, Financial Stability Review,
Banque de France, 2008, 11. February.
and , Liquidity and leverage, Journal of Financial Intermediation, 2010, 19,
418437.
Barberis, N., Investing for the long run when returns are predictable, Journal of Finance,
2000, 55, 225–264.
Bec, F. and C. Gollier, Assets Returns Volatility and Investment Horizon, Working
paper 467, IDEI, University of Toulouse 1 2007.
Campbell, J., A variance decomposition for stock returns, Economic Journal, 1991, 101,
157–179.
16
, Understanding risk and return, Journal of Political Economy, 1996, 104, 298–345.
, Asset Prices, Consumption, and the Business Cycle, in J. Taylor and M. Wood-
ford, editors, Handbook of Macroeconomics, vol.1, North-Holland: Amsterdam,
1999, pp. 1231–1303.
and L. Viceira, Strategic Asset Allocation, Oxford University Press, 2002.
and , Long-Horizon Mean-Variance Analysis: A User Guide, Manuscript,
Dept of Economics, Harvard University, Cambridge MA 2004.
Campbell, J.Y. and S. Thompson, Predicting the Equity Premium Out Of Sample:
Can Anything Beat the Historical Average?, Review of Financial Studies, 2008, 21,
1509–1531.
Cavaliere, G., A. Rahbek, and R. Taylor, Testing for Co-integration in Vector Au-
toregressions with Non-Stationary Volatility, Journal of Econometrics, 2010, 158,
7–24.
Chirstoffersen, P., Value-at-Risk models, in T. Andersen, R. Davis, J.-P. Kreiss, and
T. Mikosch, editors, Handbook of Financial Time Series, vol.1, Springer Verlag,
2009. Forthcoming.
Escanciano, J. and J. Olmo, Backtesting parametric Value-at-Risk with estimation risk,
Journal of Business and Economic Statistics, 2009.
Feunou, B. and N. Meddahi, Realized term structure of risk, Manuscript,
CIRANO,Canada 2007.
Giacomini, R. and H. White, Tests of Conditional Predictive Ability, Econometrica,
2006, 74, 1545–1578.
Gollier, C., Intergenerational risk-sharing and risk-taking of a pension fund, Journal of
Public Economics, 2008, 92, 1463–1485.
17
Guidolin, M. and A. Timmermann, Term Structure of Risk under Alternative Econo-
metric Specifications, Journal of Econometrics, 2006, 131, 285–308.
Hansen, B. and B. Seo, Testing for Two-Regime Threshold Cointegration in Vector
Error-Correction Models, Journal of Econometrics, 2002, 110, 293–318.
Hansen, B.E., Inference when a Nuisance Parameter Is Not Identified Under the Null
Hypothesis, Econometrica, 1996, 64 (2), 413–430.
Jondeau, E. and M. Rockinger, Portfolio Allocation for European markets with Pre-
dictability and Parameter Uncertainty, Mimeo, University of Lausanne 2009.
Kashyap, A. and J. Stein, Cyclical implications of the Basel II capital standards, Federal
Reserve Bank of Chicago Economic Perspectives, 2004, Q1, 18–31.
Plantin, G., H. Sapra, and H.S. Shin, Marking-to-market: Panacea or Pandora’s box?,
Journal of Accounting Research, 2008, 46.
Rochet, J.-C., Procyclicality of financial systems: Is there a need to modify current
accounting and regulatory rules?, Financial Stability Review, Banque de France,
2008, 12.
Appendix
18
Table 2: SETAR estimates
France US
µ 0.809 —
[0.39]
µℓ — 11.52
[0.04]
µm — 107.17
[0.00]
µu — 0.86
[0.30]
ρℓ -0.257 0.372
[0.06] [0.27]
ρm — 13.21
[0.00]
ρu 0.215 0.234
[0.03] [0.04]
λℓ -22.56 -9.95
λu — -6.81
R-squared 0.05 0.17
ARCH(1) p-val. 0.39 0.68
ARCH(4) p-val. 0.58 0.16
Q(4) p-val. 0.94 0.56
White F p-val. 0.25 0.53
p-values of t-statistics in [ ].
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Table 3: Out-of-sample tests of predictive accuracy
1 year 2 years 3 years 4 years 5 years
p p padj p padj p padj p padj
Expected % of
violations 5% 5% 9.7% 5% 14.3% 5% 18.5% 5% 22.6%
France 8.6% 6.4% 7.3% 4.2% 10.8% 2.6% 13.8% 0% 15.2%
U.S. 8.6% 4.8% 8.1% 2.5% 7.5% 0% 6% 0% 1.8%
Unconditional backtesting ((p(1 − p))−0.5SP )
France 1.86 0.74 -0.93 -0.42 -1.07 -1.19 -1.32 -2.43* -1.88
U.S. 1.86 -0.08 -0.63 -1.26 -2.12* -2.47* -3.47* -2.43* -5.27*
The adjusted expected % of violations, padj, is given by (1− 0.95k).
SP is defined in Escanciano-Olmo (2009). ‘*’ means rejection at 5%-level.
Table 4: France : VaRk(p), Extreme Value Simulations, Lower Regime
p (1 − 0.95k) 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4 0.45 0.5
Years
1 -0.31 -0.31 -0.22 -0.16 -0.11 -0.07 -0.03 0.01 0.05 0.09 0.13
2 -0.30 -0.40 -0.30 -0.22 -0.15 -0.09 -0.04 0.02 0.08 0.13 0.19
3 -0.26 -0.45 -0.34 -0.25 -0.17 -0.10 -0.03 0.04 0.11 0.18 0.25
4 -0.21 -0.49 -0.37 -0.27 -0.18 -0.10 -0.02 0.06 0.14 0.23 0.32
5 -0.13 -0.52 -0.39 -0.28 -0.18 -0.09 0.00 0.09 0.19 0.29 0.39
6 -0.05 -0.54 -0.40 -0.29 -0.18 -0.08 0.02 0.13 0.24 0.35 0.47
7 0.05 -0.55 -0.41 -0.29 -0.18 -0.07 0.05 0.16 0.28 0.41 0.55
8 0.17 -0.57 -0.42 -0.29 -0.17 -0.05 0.08 0.20 0.33 0.48 0.64
9 0.30 -0.57 -0.42 -0.29 -0.16 -0.03 0.11 0.25 0.39 0.55 0.72
10 0.45 -0.58 -0.43 -0.28 -0.14 -0.01 0.14 0.29 0.45 0.63 0.81
11 0.63 -0.59 -0.43 -0.27 -0.13 0.02 0.18 0.34 0.51 0.70 0.91
12 0.83 -0.60 -0.42 -0.27 -0.11 0.05 0.21 0.39 0.58 0.79 1.02
13 1.06 -0.60 -0.42 -0.26 -0.09 0.08 0.25 0.44 0.65 0.88 1.13
14 1.32 -0.60 -0.42 -0.25 -0.08 0.10 0.29 0.50 0.72 0.97 1.25
15 1.62 -0.61 -0.41 -0.23 -0.05 0.13 0.33 0.55 0.79 1.06 1.37
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Figure 4: Data (1970Q4—2012Q4)
21
−40 −30 −20 −10 0 10 20 30
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
FR residuals
De
ns
ity
 
 
FR residuals
Normal
Extreme value
Student t
Figure 5: French residuals distribution fits
−30 −25 −20 −15 −10 −5 0 5 10 15
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.06
US residuals
De
ns
ity
 
 
US residuals
Normal
Extreme value
Student−t
Figure 6: US residuals distribution fits
22
0 0.1
0.2 0.3
0.4
0
5
10
15
−1
0
1
2
VaR probability p
Extreme Value (lower regime)
Horizon k
V
a
R
k
(p
)
0 0.1
0.2 0.3
0.4
0
5
10
15
−1
0
1
2
VaR probability p
Extreme Value (upper regime)
Horizon k
V
a
R
k
(p
)
0 0.1
0.2 0.3
0.4
0
5
10
15
−2
0
2
4
VaR probability p
Student−t (lower regime)
Horizon k
V
a
R
k
(p
)
0 0.1
0.2 0.3
0.4
0
5
10
15
−2
0
2
4
VaR probability p
Student−t (upper regime)
Horizon k
V
a
R
k
(p
)
Figure 7: Regime and horizon dependent VaR in France: EV and t distributions
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Table 5: France : VaRk(p), Extreme Value Simulations, Upper Regime
p (1− 0.95k) 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4 0.45 0.5
Years
1 -0.34 -0.34 -0.27 -0.21 -0.16 -0.12 -0.08 -0.05 -0.01 0.03 0.06
2 -0.34 -0.43 -0.34 -0.27 -0.20 -0.15 -0.09 -0.04 0.01 0.06 0.12
3 -0.30 -0.48 -0.38 -0.29 -0.22 -0.15 -0.09 -0.03 0.04 0.11 0.17
4 -0.25 -0.52 -0.40 -0.31 -0.23 -0.15 -0.08 0.00 0.07 0.15 0.24
5 -0.19 -0.54 -0.42 -0.32 -0.23 -0.14 -0.06 0.03 0.12 0.21 0.31
6 -0.10 -0.57 -0.44 -0.33 -0.23 -0.13 -0.04 0.06 0.16 0.27 0.38
7 -0.01 -0.58 -0.45 -0.33 -0.23 -0.12 -0.02 0.09 0.21 0.33 0.46
8 0.10 -0.59 -0.45 -0.33 -0.22 -0.10 0.01 0.13 0.25 0.39 0.54
9 0.22 -0.60 -0.46 -0.33 -0.21 -0.08 0.04 0.17 0.31 0.45 0.62
10 0.37 -0.61 -0.46 -0.32 -0.19 -0.07 0.07 0.21 0.36 0.53 0.70
11 0.53 -0.62 -0.46 -0.32 -0.18 -0.04 0.11 0.26 0.42 0.60 0.80
12 0.72 -0.62 -0.46 -0.31 -0.17 -0.02 0.14 0.31 0.48 0.68 0.90
13 0.93 -0.62 -0.46 -0.30 -0.15 0.01 0.18 0.36 0.55 0.76 1.00
14 1.18 -0.63 -0.45 -0.29 -0.13 0.04 0.21 0.41 0.62 0.85 1.11
15 1.46 -0.63 -0.45 -0.28 -0.11 0.06 0.25 0.46 0.68 0.94 1.23
Table 6: France : VaRk(p), Student-t Simulations, Lower Regime
p (1− 0.95k) 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4 0.45 0.5
Years
1 -0.22 -0.22 -0.14 -0.09 -0.04 0.00 0.03 0.07 0.10 0.14 0.17
2 -0.18 -0.28 -0.18 -0.11 -0.04 0.02 0.07 0.12 0.18 0.23 0.29
3 -0.11 -0.31 -0.19 -0.10 -0.01 0.06 0.13 0.20 0.28 0.35 0.42
4 0.00 -0.32 -0.18 -0.07 0.02 0.12 0.21 0.30 0.39 0.48 0.58
5 0.13 -0.32 -0.17 -0.04 0.07 0.18 0.29 0.40 0.51 0.62 0.75
6 0.30 -0.32 -0.14 0.00 0.13 0.26 0.38 0.51 0.65 0.78 0.93
7 0.49 -0.31 -0.12 0.05 0.20 0.34 0.48 0.64 0.79 0.96 1.13
8 0.72 -0.30 -0.08 0.10 0.27 0.43 0.60 0.77 0.95 1.15 1.36
9 1.00 -0.28 -0.05 0.16 0.35 0.54 0.72 0.92 1.13 1.36 1.61
10 1.34 -0.26 -0.01 0.22 0.44 0.65 0.86 1.09 1.33 1.59 1.89
11 1.75 -0.24 0.05 0.30 0.54 0.77 1.01 1.27 1.56 1.87 2.20
12 2.22 -0.21 0.10 0.37 0.64 0.90 1.18 1.48 1.80 2.15 2.54
13 2.79 -0.18 0.15 0.46 0.76 1.05 1.37 1.70 2.07 2.46 2.91
14 3.47 -0.15 0.22 0.55 0.88 1.21 1.57 1.94 2.35 2.81 3.33
15 4.30 -0.12 0.29 0.66 1.01 1.39 1.78 2.21 2.68 3.21 3.81
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